The political transition Venezuela faces today cannot be analyzed under the parameters of the classical transitions observed in Chile, Argentina, or Poland. Comparing the Venezuelan case to those experiences is methodologically incorrect unless a decisive structural variable is acknowledged: the nature of the regime that must be dismantled. In the comparative literature on democratic transitions (O’Donnell, Schmitter, Przeworski), the central assumption is that an authoritarian regime constitutes a political system that controls the State while preserving a recognizable institutional structure distinct from entrenched criminal networks. In Venezuela’s case, however, this premise proves insufficient.
It cannot be conceived as an “optimal democratic transition” without recognizing the singularity of the Venezuelan regime. This is not simply a military dictatorship or a hegemonic party system. It is a State captured by a hybrid political-criminal network, supported internationally, characterized by fractured institutions and structurally perverse incentives for the preservation of power. This distinction is not rhetorical; it is legal, strategic, and political. A misinterpretation of this reality could lead to suboptimal policy design toward Venezuela. In particular, U.S. foreign policy, if it does not selectively alter the regime’s internal incentive structure, may unintentionally reinforce the cohesion of the dominant coalition rather than facilitate its transformation.
This diagnosis requires a precise definition of what is meant by a Captured State. In this context, institutional capture refers to the systematic colonization of state organs by networks that subordinate formal legality to particular interests, eroding the distinction between public authority and private benefit. The State thus ceases to function as a neutral arbiter and instead operates as a mechanism for reproducing private interests embedded within its own institutional structure.
- Classical Dictatorship vs. Criminally Captured State
This comparison summarizes the distinction with precision:
| Variable | Classical Transition (Chile/Argentina/Poland) | Venezuela Case | ||
| Nature of the Regime |
|
Hybrid political-criminal network | ||
| Dominant Incentive Structure | Loss of political power + social pressure + economic crisis + military exhaustion | International imprisonment + loss of illicit rents + social pressure with limited impact on elite | ||
| External Strategic Environment | Ideological struggle during the Cold War |
|
||
| Armed Forces | Institutional actor with doctrine |
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| International Support | Progressive isolation | Strategic backing from Russia, China, and Iran | ||
| Transition Risk | Domestic prosecutions | Transnational criminal exposure |
This table illustrates why the transition tools of the past—elite pacts, broad amnesties, and sweeping guarantees for all actors—do not function in a context where power is motivated not merely by political survival, but by the preservation of personal liberty and the benefits derived from a criminal network. In Chile, the transition involved negotiating guarantees for military leaders seeking to preserve the institution. In Poland, the Communist Party negotiated amid an irreversible ideological collapse.
In Venezuela, the ruling elite faces:
- Individual international sanctions.
- Narcotrafficking investigations.
- Exposure across multiple jurisdictions.
- Extraterritorial economic interests.
- Illicit financing networks that sustain political power.
This alters classical transition theory. The central issue is no longer simply how to relinquish power, but how to do so without losing personal liberty, assets, and international protection. These incentives are internal to the regime and shape its strategic rationality. By contrast, the pressure derived from the perception of Venezuela as a security risk to the United States constitutes an external variable that alters the broader environment but does not automatically change the individual cost-benefit calculations of the ruling elite. Analytically, this requires distinguishing between an endogenous incentive structure and exogenous strategic pressure. Therein lies the Venezuelan singularity.
From the perspective of authoritarian coalition theory, regimes are not sustained by a single central figure but by a coalition of actors who distribute selective benefits in exchange for political loyalty. In the Venezuelan case, this coalition is structured around institutional control, access to formal and informal rents, and protection against legal risk. If the transition simultaneously threatens these three pillars without offering differentiated exit pathways, the coalition will tend to consolidate rather than fracture. Accordingly, U.S. foreign policy that does not selectively alter these incentives is likely to strengthen the cohesion of the dominant coalition. Comparative experience demonstrates that successful transitions occur when the ruling coalition ceases to be homogeneous. In the context of a Captured State, fragmentation does not result from generalized pressure, but from the strategic differentiation of incentives that changes the individual costs of remaining within the coalition. Without such calibrated design, internal cohesion tends to reinforce itself.
The Chávez regime—particularly during the final years of Maduro and following his capture in 2026—does not behave like a classical military regime. Its structures are intertwined with networks of corruption, narcotrafficking, clientelism, and geopolitical relationships with powers whose strategic interests do not necessarily align with deep institutional democratization.
- Why This Transition Requires a New Model
A Captured State Transition is a process of institutional reconfiguration in which the objective is not merely political alternation, but the reconstruction of state autonomy from networks that instrumentalized its structure. Accordingly, Venezuela does not require only reforms or free elections; it requires a transition architecture designed to reverse institutional capture, restore the rule of law, and ensure that justice does not become either a manual of impunity or a system of vengeance.
Such a framework does not exist in classical transition experiences. For that reason, I propose conceptualizing the Venezuelan process as:
Captured State Transition (CST)
CST is a model of political transition grounded in three fundamental premises:
- The regime is not merely authoritarian; it is a political system embedded within transnational criminal networks.
- Law enforcement institutions, the judiciary, and public administration require deep structural cleansing, not merely superficial concessions.
- The transition cannot be sustained without a legal framework capable of generating incentives to dismantle those networks while attracting cooperative actors without sacrificing justice.
This fundamentally alters the logic of transitional law.
III. What Is Classical Transitional Justice?
In classical political transitions to democracy, tools such as the following are typically employed:
🔹 Partial political amnesties — to ease tensions and encourage negotiations (for example, Chile and Argentina in the 1980s).
🔹 Non-prosecution guarantees for outgoing regime actors — to facilitate their subsequent integration into the new political order.
🔹 Truth and reparation commissions — as mechanisms for national reconciliation within a framework where state institutions remain fundamentally intact.
From an institutional theory perspective, this implies moving from an “authoritarian equilibrium based on illicit rents” to a “democratic equilibrium grounded in formal rules.” In the Venezuelan case, that authoritarian equilibrium assumes a particularly pronounced transnational dimension. Dominant actors find themselves trapped in a framework in which cooperating with the transition may entail self-incrimination or criminal exposure across multiple jurisdictions. For this reason, legal design is not peripheral but central. Classical transition tools function when the regime retains institutions with a certain degree of autonomy. They are far less effective in a context where the institutional fabric has been captured by networks that subordinate formal legality to particular interests, and where the principal risk for the ruling elite is not the loss of political power, but exposure to national or international criminal liability for transnational offenses.
- Amnesty in Venezuela as an Example of Dynamic Difference
The amnesty law currently under debate in Venezuela in 2026 is designed—according to its first reading—to release political prisoners and correct arbitrary detentions dating back to 1999, while explicitly excluding serious crimes such as homicide, drug trafficking, human rights violations, and crimes against humanity.
This marks a crucial distinction:
✔ It is not an amnesty for regime leaders.
✔ It does not seek to shield serious crimes or criminal structures.
✔ It aims to release citizens persecuted for their political activity.
This makes it a legitimate and necessary instrument within a transition—but not a sufficient one. Criticism from organizations such as Foro Penal and from families of detainees underscores that many political prisoners could still be excluded depending on how the text is interpreted, and that essential components—such as reparations, legal clarity, and guarantees of non-repetition—remain insufficiently addressed. This debate demonstrates something fundamental: an amnesty in Venezuela cannot replicate the function it served in classical transitions. It is not merely a concession to release political prisoners. It is one element within a far more complex process: opening the political system without insulating the criminal apparatus that sustained it.
- Laws Required for a Captured State Transition
A Captured State Transition (CST) requires not a single law, but an interrelated legal framework that clearly defines:
- Conditional Political Amnesty Law
- Release of political prisoners.
- Categorical exclusion of serious crimes.
- Non-repetition requirements.
- Structural Transitional Justice Law
- Truth commissions with an international mandate.
- Comprehensive reparations.
- Independent judicial investigative procedures.
- Judicial and State Security Reform Law
- Vetting and removal of compromised judges and prosecutors.
- Restructuring of security forces in accordance with international standards. internacionales.
- Transitional International Cooperation Law
- Mechanisms for cooperation with international jurisdictions in cases involving transnational crimes.
- Information-sharing and extradition procedures, where applicable.
- Framework of Guarantees Against Arbitrary Prosecution
- Protections for emerging political actors.
- Legal safeguards for individuals who cooperate with justice authorities.
These laws are not mere patches. They constitute a new model of transitional regulation tailored to a State that has been captured ideologically, criminally, and structurally.
- Strategic Steps in a CST (Captured State Transition)
- Establishment of a truth commission with international observers.
- Comprehensive reform of the judiciary and state security systems.
- Dismantling of criminal networks embedded within the State, with international cooperation.
- A credible electoral process under new rules and institutional frameworks.
VII. The Role of the United States and the Priority of Interests
The path of transition is not linear but sequential and carefully calibrated to balance justice, stability, and democratic reintegration. In Captured States, external actors do not engage with neutral institutions, but with structures previously colonized by power networks that distort the formal logic of the State. This reality inevitably shapes international involvement and, in particular, the role of the United States in the Venezuelan process. U.S. participation in Venezuela during 2025–2026 cannot be analyzed as a simple policy of democratic promotion. It encompasses a broader strategic dimension that includes:
🔹 Preserving hemispheric influence.
🔹 Securing control over key energy resources (Venezuelan oil).
🔹 Regional stabilization and migration flow management.
This requires an honest assessment. The United States is not acting solely on democratic principles. Under the administration of President Donald Trump, foreign policy prioritizes strategic realism. U.S. foreign policy operates within a clear hierarchy of national interests in which strategic resources and regional stability may weigh as heavily as—or even more heavily than—the normative promotion of democracy. It encompasses a broader strategic dimension that includes:
- Oil licensing and regulatory flexibilization measures aimed at reactivating production and facilitating U.S. energy operations.
- The January 2026 operation that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro was accompanied by energy and cooperation negotiations with interim authorities.
- Within Washington, tensions persist among security, energy, and democracy priorities.
This does not constitute a moral critique, but rather a strategic reality that must be carefully integrated into the design of the transition.
VIII. The Risk of “Political Normalization” with the Government of Delcy
One of the most significant—and least discussed—risks is that the White House may adopt a low-cost pragmatic logic: engaging with whoever can guarantee immediate operational stability. In this context, Delcy Rodríguez emerges as a functional interlocutor. The issue is not personal; it is structural. If Washington prioritizes:
- Stable energy flows,
- Migration control,
- Minimal security cooperation,
it may ultimately normalize a structure that has not been dismantled. This would be dangerous because:
- The continuity of central actors from the former regime raises serious questions about the depth of institutional transformation.
- A functional and comfortable relationship may legitimize continuity without reform.
- An energy-efficient strategy for the United States does not necessarily equate to genuine democratization.
The risk materializes when geopolitics and resource considerations become the primary metric, displacing deep institutional reconstruction. A policy centered exclusively on resource management may produce superficial stability, but not democratic consolidation.
- Political and Legal Implications
Following the framework of a Captured State Transition, U.S. participation cannot substitute for internal legal architecture. It must be complementary. This requires two clear conditions:
Strategic understanding in Washington. The United States must recognize that:
- Releasing political prisoners (through amnesty) is necessary but insufficient.
- lectoral opening without institutional reform reproduces capture.
- The judicial and security systems require structural reconstruction.
- The Chilean or Polish transition models cannot be applied to a State penetrated by criminal networks.
- Support is required for legal frameworks that dismantle illicit incentive structures.
It is also necessary to support:
- Transitional justice laws adapted to the Venezuelan case.
- International judicial cooperation in addressing transnational crimes.
- Security and judicial reforms under technical supervision.
Otherwise, U.S. policy will be reduced to short-term tactical stabilization, where the explicit objective becomes resource control rather than institutional refoundation.
Conclusion
Venezuela’s transition should not be conceived as a classical redemocratization process because its institutional, geopolitical, and criminal context is fundamentally different. The amnesty for political prisoners—which explicitly excludes serious crimes—is a necessary step, but only one component within a far broader and more structural legal architecture.
What Venezuela requires is a Captured State Transition (CST)—a legal and political model that:
✔ Recognizes the institutional capture of power,,
✔ Protects fundamental freedoms without shielding criminality,
✔ Introduces legal mechanisms that promote the dismantling of criminal networks,
✔ Ensures justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition,
✔ And establishes the minimum conditions for sustainable democracy.
Without this framework, any transition risks becoming superficial, partial, or reversible. Venezuela’s transition will not be an illusion of elite pacts; it must be a profound and strategic legal process aimed at reconstructing a State that has been hijacked from within. If the United States understands this, it can become a catalyst for sustainable institutional reconstruction and align strategic interests with lasting democratic stability. A strategy centered exclusively on energy stabilization may produce immediate operational results, but it will not necessarily consolidate a sustainable institutional framework and may instead entrench a new form of authoritarian normalization.
The dilemma is not democracy versus national interests. The dilemma is short-term gains versus long-term structural stability. From the perspective of democratic consolidation theory, poorly designed transitions do not fail immediately. The difference between transactional stability and institutional stability will determine whether Venezuela becomes a reliable partner or a recurring structural risk.